DIVISIBLE MONEY IN AN ECONOMY WITH VILLAGES by Miquel Faig
April 15, 2004
Revised: July 13, 2005
DIVISIBLE MONEY IN AN ECONOMY WITH VILLAGES
Miquel Faig∗
University of Toronto
∗I am grateful of the comments received from Neil Wallace, Randy Wright, Gabriele
Camera, Tao Zhu, and Shouyong Shi as well as those received from participants of the
Summer North American Meetings of the Econometric Society and the Summer Workshop
at the Cleveland Fed in 2004. I am also grateful of the ﬁnancial support from SSHRC of
Canada. The usual disclaimer applies. Author’s address: 140 St. George Street, Suite 707,
Toronto, Canada, M5S 3G6. E-mail: mfaig@chass.utoronto.ca. Phone: (416) 978-0308.
Fax: (416) 978-5519.
1Abstract
This paper provides a tractable search model with divisible money that encompasses the
two frameworks currently used in the literature. Individuals belong to many villages. Inside
a village, individuals know each other so ﬁnancial contracts are feasible. Money is essential
to facilitate trade across villages. When ﬁnancial markets inside a village are complete, the
model generalizes the framework advanced by Lagos and Wright (2005) without having
to assume quasi-linear preferences. Likewise, complete ﬁnancial markets in each village
substitutes for the representative household in the framework advanced by Shi (1997). The
paper describes sets of ﬁnancial arrangements that complete the markets inside the villages.
In general, these ﬁnancial arrangements include a combination of credit and insurance.
However, if individuals choose period by period the trading role they play outside their
village, then under some parametric restrictions either a lottery or a risk-free bond market
are suﬃcient.
Keywords: monetary search, divisible money.
JEL: E40.
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Monetary search models have provided rich insights on the foundations of money, and they
have become the dominant paradigm in this ﬁeld of economics. To facilitate tractability,
early monetary search models made strong assumptions on the properties of money
(indivisibility and limited storage capacity). These strong assumptions prevented the study
of many interesting issues such as inﬂation. Thanks to the work of Shi (1997) and Lagos and
W r i g h t( 2 0 0 5 ) ,w eh a v en o wt w od i s t i n c tf r a m e w o r k st h a ty i e l dt r a c t a b l em o n e t a r ys e a r c h
models with divisible money. Both frameworks use a trick to obtain a tractable distribution
of money balances. In the case of Shi, the trick is the assumption that individuals belong
to large households. In the case of Lagos and Wright, the trick is the assumption that
utility is linear on a good traded in a competitive market. The present paper introduces a
framework that encompasses those advanced by Shi (1997), and Lagos and Wright (2005).
In the model of this paper, individuals belong to villages.1 Each village contains a large
number of individuals, but it is only a small part of the global economy. In a village,
individuals are not altruistic as in a household, but they know their neighbors. Therefore,
ﬁnancial contracts such as insurance and credit are feasible among individuals of the same
village. Despite the existence of ﬁnancial contracts inside the village, money is still essential
to facilitate trade with anonymous individuals from other villages. This model captures
in a simple fashion that in our daily economic interactions sometimes we deal with well
identiﬁed and easy to trace individuals and sometimes we deal with relative strangers that
can easily disappear from our lives.
If the set of ﬁnancial markets inside the villages is complete (all individuals share the
same marginal rates of substitution for all commodities traded there), then the ﬁnancial
deals inside villages substitute for the representative household in Shi (1997) to attain
1 Jin and Temzelides (2004) advance also a random search model with villages to generate equilibria
where money is used in some exchanges while credit is used in some others. However, they do not
attempt to use villages to make tractable the divisibility of money. In their model, both money and
goods are indivisible, and credit is a gift giving equilibrium with trigger strategies.
3a simple distribution of money holdings. The idea that the large household construct
substitutes for ﬁnancial markets goes, at least, as far back as Lucas (1990). The present
contribution takes seriously Lucas’ idea and ﬂeshes out the mechanisms that arise in the
village to exhaust the gains from trade among villagers. There are several advantages to
design these mechanisms explicitly. Typically, the mechanisms are ﬁnancial contracts which
are interesting on themselves. Moreover, by designing the ﬁnancial contracts needed to
complete the market eliminates the ambiguity on the objectives of buyers and sellers when
they interact in a trade meeting. Finally, using numerical methods, one can in principle
relax the assumptions that are required to give rise to a complete set of ﬁnancial markets
inside the village to ﬁnd out how relevant they are to a particular issue.
At the same time, the complete set of ﬁnancial markets inside the villages allows for
more general preferences than those assumed by Lagos and Wright (2005). In Lagos and
Wright, during the day individuals trade in a frictionless competitive market a good that
yields constant marginal utility (quasi-linear preferences), at night they trade anonymously
in frictional search markets. In the framework of this paper, we can add that during the
day individuals are able to trade ﬁnancial instruments with their fellow villagers, but at
night these ﬁnancial markets are closed because individuals are away from their village.
With quasi-linear preferences, the ﬁnancial markets inside the villages are complete even
without any ﬁnancial trades. As shown by Lagos and Wright (2005), during the day the
unbounded trades on the good with a constant marginal utility equalizes the marginal rates
of substitution for any pair of commodities among all people. In turn, this implies a simple
distribution of money holdings. With the village structure, quasi-linear preferences are not
a necessary assumption for this result. Financial arrangements can substitute for the trades
on the good that yields linear utility to obtain similar outcomes.
Relaxing the quasi-linearity of preferences is important for several reasons. Quasi-linear
preferences imply risk neutrality. Moreover, their usefulness in delivering a tractable
distribution of money holdings rest on the absence of liquidity constraints during the day.
Therefore, resting on these preferences to support tractability rules out most of the issues
4dealt in ﬁnancial economics. Also, quasi-linear preferences rule out wealth eﬀects on all
goods except for the one that yields constant marginal utility. This hinders the study of
many interesting issues in macroeconomics where wealth eﬀects are important.
The main conclusions of the paper can be summarized as follows. As economists trained
in the basic theorems of welfare economics would expect, each village acts as a well deﬁned
representative household when the set of ﬁnancial markets inside the villages is complete.
What is more surprising is the type of instruments that in some instances are suﬃcient
to complete these ﬁnancial markets. If the individuals choose endogenously their trading
role (buyer-seller) in the frictional night markets, then, under some parametric restrictions,
either a lottery or a risk-free bond are suﬃcient instruments to exhaust the gains from
ﬁnancial trades inside the village. In general, the complete set of markets includes the
insurance of risks on trading opportunities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model of this paper is analyzed
in Section 2. This model uses credit and insurance to complete the ﬁnancial markets inside
the villages. Section 3 provides the conditions for a simple lottery to substitute credit and
insurance as the instrument for achieving market completeness inside the villages. Section
4 discusses the robustness of the main results of the paper and concludes. An Appendix
collects the most technical parts of the proofs.
2 The Model
The economy is composed of a continuum of measure one of individuals. Individuals live
in a continuum of measure one of symmetric villages. Inside their village, individuals know
each other. Outside their village, individuals can easily hide their true identity, so they are
anonymous.
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. Each period consists of two subperiods:
day and night. During the day, all the individuals can produce and consume a general
nondurable good, which is traded competitively inside each village. Also during the day,
5individuals trade competitively with their fellow villagers a set of ﬁnancial contracts to
be speciﬁed below. During the night, individuals trade nondurable goods speciﬁct oe a c h
village. All individuals can produce the good from their own village. Moreover, they
all consume one speciﬁc good from another village. The speciﬁc good consumed diﬀers
randomly across time and across villagers. This environment gives rise to potential gains
from trading outside the village of origin. At the same time, it precludes the possibility of
long term relationships between buyers and sellers from diﬀerent villages. Finally, it avoids
that one individual can purchase outside goods for other fellow villagers.
At night, goods are traded in search markets where each individual is a price taker as in
the competitive equilibrium concept employed by Rocheteau and Wright (2003 and 2005).2
In the present environment, we can visualize this equilibrium concept as follows. Every
night, a market for each speciﬁc good (one for each village) opens. In every market there is
a Walrasian auctioneer that ﬁnds the competitive price that clears the market. All potential
traders must search for the appropriate market place of the good they want to buy or sell.
If successful, individuals are able to trade this good at the competitive price.
Individuals do not ﬁnd by accident markets for which they do not search, so each
individual must decide during the day if they are going to search for the market that trades
the speciﬁc good from their own village, in which case the individual is going to be a seller,
or for the market that trades the speciﬁc good they would like to consume, in which case
the individual is going to be a buyer. For short, it is convenient to call the individuals that
choose the ﬁrst option “sellers” and individuals that choose the second option “buyers.”
In the symmetric equilibrium we focus on, all markets for each speciﬁcg o o dh a v et h e
same measures of buyers and sellers, and all markets clear at the same price. Therefore,
each one of these markets is representative of all the others. The probabilities that a buyer
and a seller are able to trade in this representative market are denoted respectively by
πb (θ) and πs (θ), where θ is the measure of individuals that choose to be sellers in period t.
2 As Rocheteau and Wright acknowledge, this concept is closely related to the one used much earlier
by Lucas and Prescott (1974).
6(Throughout the paper time subscripts are omitted when they are not strictly necessary.)
Both functions πb and πs are continuously diﬀerentiable. The function πb is convex and
increasing, with terminal conditions: πb (0) = 0 and πb(1) = 1. The function πs is concave,
decreasing, πs (0) = 1, and πs (1) = 0. In bilateral matching, these functions must also
satisfy: (1 − θ)πb (θ)=θπs (θ). However, this restriction is not necessary for most results,
so it will only be imposed as an interesting special case.
Despite the competitive nature of all markets, there is a role for money in this model
because at night buyers are anonymous in the markets they trade and there is a lack of
double coincidence of wants.3 Money is an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible, and
storable asset. The money supply grows at a constant gross rate γ : M+1 = γM,w h e r eM
is the aggregate quantity of money and subscript +1 denotes next period. New money is
injected via a lump-sum transfer to all individuals at the beginning of each day.












where x and y are respectively quantities consumed and produced of the general good, and
qb and qs are the quantities consumed or produced of speciﬁc goods. The expectation in
(1) is conditional on the information at the beginning of period t. The functions Ud and
Un are continuously diﬀerentiable, concave, increasing in x and qb, and decreasing in y and
qs. The maximum quantities an individual can produce, y and qs, are bounded. Finally,
Un (0,0) = 0, and the standard Inada conditions for interior solutions apply. The discount
and money growth factors obey: γ>β .
A typical period proceeds as follows. During the day, individuals produce, trade, and
consume the general good in their village of origin. Also during the day, individuals trade
3 Levine (1991) provides an early discussion of this point. See also Kocherlakota (1998).
4 The restriction that β is greater than 1/2 implies that the real interest rate is lower than 1. This
restriction is important for the results of this section, but it is not for those in the next one.
7with their fellow villagers an array of ﬁnancial securities to be described below and choose
the quantity of money to be held overnight. The optimal choices made during the day
depend on the choice of being a seller or a buyer at night. Therefore, it is optimal for the
individuals to make this choice prior to the other activities that take place during the day.
At night, individuals search for one of the markets trading speciﬁc goods. Sellers search
for the market trading the speciﬁc good of their own village. Buyers search for the market
trading the speciﬁc good they would like to consume. Individuals successful in ﬁnding the
market they are searching for trade money for goods at the competitive price. As a result
of these trades, sellers produce, buyers consume, and money changes hands from buyers to
sellers.
One of the objectives of the paper is to investigate alternative sets of ﬁnancial securities
that complete the ﬁnancial markets inside the villages (equate the intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution for the general good across all villagers.) At this point, it is assumed
that individuals can trade two type of instruments: credit and insurance. As it will be seen,
these instruments are suﬃcient to complete the ﬁnancial markets inside the village. Later
on, the paper inquires for conditions that make one or both of these types of instruments
redundant. In so doing, the paper characterizes alternative informational requirements that
support equilibria with simple distributions of money holdings.
The credit instrument individuals can trade inside their village is a risk-free real bond.
This bond is a promise to deliver one unit of the general good next period at the price of
(1 + r)
−1 general goods today. Individuals demand bonds in this model because in some
periods they accumulate wealth (while they are sellers), while other periods they spend
their wealth (while they are buyers). Also, individuals may use these bonds to self-insure.
The only informational requirement for the viability of this ﬁnancial instrument is that the
issuers of these bonds are known and they can be punished upon default. These bonds
cannot be traded across villages because the buyers of these bonds would not know the
issuer.
In addition to credit, individuals can buy insurance in their village against the risks on
8trading opportunities at the night markets. Speciﬁcally, buyers can purchase a contract
for the delivery of µb general goods next morning contingent upon reaching the targeted
search market at night. To implement this contract, buyers must be able to prove that
they reached the market. This is clearly accomplished if all other fellow villagers can
observe this event. However, it can also be accomplished with less demanding informational
requirements. For example, it is suﬃcient if one can take the proverbial self-portrait holding
today’s newspaper with the targeted market in the background. Certainly, the requirement
that the buyer can provide such as proof is not logically incompatible with being anonymous
at night. Likewise, sellers can purchase a contract for the delivery of µs general goods
next morning contingent upon failing to meet the market where the speciﬁc village good
is traded. Again, the seller must be able to prove that such event occurred, which is not
incoherent with the anonymity required for money to be essential. For example, since all
sellers of the same village go to the same market, it is reasonable to assume that the list of
those who reached such a market and the list of those who did not is public knowledge in
the village. Even if sellers in that market are known by other sellers, this does not mean
that buyers cannot be anonymous, which is what makes money essential. The fair premia
to acquire the insurance contracts are respectively µbπb and µs (1 − πs).5 For notational
ease, these premia are assumed to be payable next morning.
The paper focusses on symmetric, stationary, monetary competitive equilibria. In a
competitive equilibrium, individuals maximize utility taking as given the sequence of
prices of the following items: the general good, the speciﬁcg o o d s ,t h er e a lb o n d s ,a n dt h e
insurance premia. They also take as given the lump-sum transfers from the government
and the aggregate fraction of individuals that choose to be sellers at night. The equilibrium
is monetary if money is valued. The equilibrium is stationary if the price of speciﬁc goods
relative to the price of the general good, p, the real quantity of money held by buyers in
terms of the general good, mb, and the fraction of individuals that choose to be sellers, θ,
are constant over time. The equilibrium is symmetric if these magnitudes are equal across
5 To avoid cumbersome expressions, the argument θ is dropped in π
b (θ) and π
s (θ).
9both villages and markets for speciﬁc goods.
In a stationary equilibrium, the nominal prices of the general good and the speciﬁc
goods must grow at the gross rate γ. Moreover, the real interest rate must be equal to
the subjective discount rate: r = β
−1 − 1, otherwise consumption would grow or decline
over time. Therefore, to characterize an equilibrium we will proceed as follows. First, we
will characterize the behavior of individuals in a stationary environment with a constant
inﬂation rate and a real interest rate equal to the subjective discount rate. Then, we will
determine the relative price p and the measure of sellers θ that clear the markets for general
and speciﬁc goods.
2.1 The Behavior of Individuals
Consider an individual facing fair insurance and a constant vector (p,θ,γ,r) where
r = β
−1 − 1. Early each day, the individual receives a monetary transfer which real value is
constant and equal to τ.
Prior to all trades, the individual chooses day by day the trading role to be performed
at night. This is a binary non-convex choice, in which the individual picks the alternative,
buyer or seller, that yields the highest utility. As a result, the value function V of the
individual at the beginning of each day obeys:







where a is the wealth (in units of the general good), and V b and V s are the value functions
conditional on being, respectively, a buyer or a seller during the day.
To characterize the optimal plans of an individual as a buyer and as a seller, it is
convenient to start with the conditional optimal demands for money. In the environment
considered, the gross real rate of return on bonds is β
−1. Meanwhile, the gross real rate of
return on money is γ−1 (the inverse of the gross inﬂation rate.) Therefore, the assumption
γ>βimplies that bonds earn a higher return than money. As long as V is increasing (it
will be), it is never optimal for an individual to demand a dollar today that with certainty
10will not be spent tonight. Therefore, the demand for money of a seller is zero, while the
real demand for money of a buyer is mb = pqb, where qb is the quantity of speciﬁc goods
demanded at night if search is successful.
Conditional on being a buyer, the individual chooses the quantities of the general
good to be consumed xb and produced yb, the real demands for money mb and bonds
bb, and the insurance coverage µb. These choices must satisfy the budget constraint:
xb + mb + bb (1 + r)




b (1 + r)
−1 = y
b + a + τ. (3)
The optimal plan for the individual as a buyer is represented by a vector (xb,yb,q b,b b,µ b)

































subject to (3). The terms ab1
t+1 and ab0
t+1 denote the wealth next morning contingent on


















With probability πb, the individual is successful searching at night. In this case, the
individual consumes qb at night, and the wealth next period is given by (6). With
complementary probability, the individual fails to ﬁnd the targeted market. As a result,
the individual consumes nothing at night, which yields zero utility. In this instance, the
wealth next period is (5). Analogously, conditional on being a seller the individual chooses

























11subject to the budget constraint
x
s + b
s (1 + r)
−1 = y
s + a + τ. (8)
The terms ab1
+1 and as0
+1 denote, respectively, the wealth next morning if the individual ﬁnds
















s (1 − π
s). (10)
In addition to all constraints speciﬁed above, the individual faces a No-Ponzi game
condition. That is, there is an endogenous lower bound on next period’s wealth to ensure
that the individual will be able to repay the amounts borrowed with probability one without
reliance to unbounded borrowing:
a+1 ≥ amin with probability one. (11)
In general, the wealth at the beginning of next period, a+1, is stochastic because it depends
not only on the buyer-seller choice but also on the random success of the night’s search.
The lower bound amin is equal to minus the present discounted value of the maximum
guaranteed income the individual can obtain as a seller.
The optimization program described in equations (3) to (11) can be characterized using
standard recursive methods. This is a convenient feature of this model, which is absent
with quasi-linear preferences and unbounded demands for the general good. A key step in
this characterization is the following properties about the value function:
Proposition 1: The value function V is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and
concave. Furthermore, V is aﬃne in an interval [a,a] ⊆ [amin,∞):
V (a)=v0 + va, for a ∈ [a,a]; (12)
where v0 and v are coeﬃcients independent of wealth. The interval [a,a] is absorbing
in the sense that optimal behavior implies that if a ∈ [a,a], then a+1 ∈ [a,a] with
12probability one.
The linear segment of V (12) is due to the daily endogenous choice of trading role by
each individual. Intuitively, if an individual is not rich enough to be a buyer forever and
not so poor to have to be a seller at perpetuity, then the individual will alternate between
being a buyer and a seller. As the individual does so, wealth does not aﬀect the quantities
consumed or produced conditional on being a buyer or a seller. Instead, wealth aﬀects how
often and how early the individual decides to be a buyer or a seller. Since utility is linear
on the times and the timing an individual gets the incremental expected utilities of being a
b u y e ro ras e l l e rf o ro n ep e r i o d ,t h ev a l u ef u n c t i o ni sl i n e a r .
The property that the interval [a,a] is absorbing simpliﬁes the characterization of an
equilibrium dramatically. As long as all individuals have initial wealth in the interval [a,a],
as it will be assumed from now on, the behavior of all buyers and all sellers is independent
from their wealth. Therefore, the distribution of money holdings is easily characterized.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. The crucial step in this proof is presented
here. This step uses the Bellman’s equation (3) to (11) to deﬁne a mapping T from the
value function V for period t +1in the right hand sides of (4) and (7) onto the value
function for period t in the left hand side of (2), to be denoted for the rest of this proof TV.
A ss h o w ni nt h en e x tf e wp a r a g r a p h s ,i fV is increasing and concave, and it has the linear
segment (12), then, for a particular set of values of the coeﬃcients v0,v ,a , and a, TV is
also increasing and concave, and it has an identical linear segment to the one V has. Since
T is a contraction mapping (see the Appendix), the unique true value function must have
all these properties.
Consider an individual whose value function V for period t +1is increasing and concave
with the linear segment (12). Because V is concave, it is an optimal plan at t to fully insure
risks on trading opportunities. Hence, it is optimal for the individual to purchase contracts
that satisfy: µb = γ−1pqb and µs = γ−1pqs. Furthermore, only plans with full insurance are
optimal if there is a positive probability that a+1 will lie on a strictly concave region of V.
With full insurance, a+1 is not stochastic. Let ab
+1 and as
+1 be the respective wealths at t+1
13that the individual attains as a fully insured buyer or as a fully insured seller. If ab
+1 lies in
the linear interval [a,a], then (12) and mb = pqb imply that the utility at t conditional on
being a buyer (4) is equal to:
V
b (a)=S
b + βv0 + vτ + va; (13)
where Sb is the expected trade surplus of the individual as a buyer:
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and i ≡ (γ − β)/β =( 1+r)γ −1 is the nominal rate of interest earned on bonds. Since Sb
is independent from a, the value function V b(a) has a linear segment with the same slope
as the one in V. Similarly, if as
+1 ∈ [a,a], the utility at t conditional on being a seller (7) is
V
s (a)=S
s + βv0 + vτ + va; (15)
where Ss i st h ee x p e c t e dt r a d es u r p l u so ft h ei n d i v i d u a la sas e l l e r :
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Again, V s (a) has a linear segment with the same slope as V.
The optimal plan
¡
x∗b,y ∗b,q ∗b,x ∗s,y ∗s,q∗s¢
that solves the maximization programs (14)
















































The properties of Ud and Un ensure that (17) has a unique solution, which is interior.





















With these deﬁnitions, the ﬂow budget constraint for an individual simpliﬁes into
a
j
+1 =( 1+r)(a − z∗j) for j = b and s. Let
£
aj,aj¤
be the interval of present wealth that
leads to a
j
+1 ∈ [a,a] next period for j = b and s.T h a ti s ,
£
ab,ab¤
and [as,as] are respectively











∗j for j = b and s. (21)
Let the values of the coeﬃcients v0,v ,a , and a be implicitly deﬁned by the following set
of equations:
a =














where S∗b and S∗s are the optimized values of (14) and (16).6 With these coeﬃcient values,
the linear segments of V b and V s lie on a common aﬃne function as displayed in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the value functions V s and V b have been displayed with linear intervals
with bounds that obey: as <a b < as < ab. These inequalities are implied by r ∈ (0,1),
(18), (19), (20), and (21) to (23).7 Moreover, V b and V s cross only in the interval that
they share a common slope. This property is implied by the following argument. The
inequality z∗b >z ∗s implies that ab
+1 <a s
+1. Using the Envelope Theorem, the derivatives
6 The existence of a unique solution to this system of equations can be easily established using the
following facts: If v → 0,S
∗b >S
∗s.I fv →∞ ,S
∗b <S
∗s. S
∗b is decreasing with v. S
∗s is increasing with v.
7 If β were lower than 0.5, then r>1 and a
b > a
s. As a result, the segment [a,a] is not absorbing and the proof fails.
15of V b and V s are respectively proportional to V 0(ab
+1) and V 0(as
+1). Hence, the concavity of
V combined with ab
+1 <a s
+1 implies that V b cannot be ﬂatter than V s when evaluated at
the same wealth. Therefore, V b and V s can only cross once. This crossing must be in the
linear interval for the inequalities stated above to hold.
Figure 1 is useful to describe when an individual chooses to be a buyers or a seller. At
each level of wealth, the individual picks the trading role that brings maximum utility.
Therefore, the individual chooses to be a seller if a<a b. The individual is indiﬀerent
between being a buyer and a seller if a ∈
£
ab,as¤
. Finally, the individual decides to be a
buyer if a>as. Given the deﬁnitions of
£
ab,ab¤




,t h e na+1 ∈ [a,a]. Therefore, [a,a] is absorbing. Moreover, TV (a) is
increasing and concave, and it has the same linear segment as V. As a result, the true value
function must have these properties.
2.2 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for the general good during the day and the
speciﬁc goods at night must clear. Therefore, the equilibrium relative price of speciﬁca n d
general goods and the fraction of individuals choosing to be sellers (p and θ) are determined
by the following two market clearing conditions:
(1 − θ)x
∗b + θx















Formally, an equilibrium is an optimal plan
¡
x∗b,y∗b,q∗b,x ∗s,y ∗s,q ∗s¢
, a marginal value of
wealth (v), and a triple (p,θ,τ) that satisfy (17), the equality of trading surpluses (25), the
market clearing conditions (26) and (27), and the government budget constraint (28).
The characterization of an equilibrium is greatly simpliﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a t( 1 8 )a n d( 2 6 )
16imply x∗s = x∗b = y∗s = y∗b ≡ x∗. Using (17), these equalities imply that the equilibrium










Consequently, consumption and productioni nt h eg e n e r a lg o o d sm a r k e ti si n d e p e n d e n t





















Un (0,q∗s) − Un




Hence, the equilibrium values of q∗b,q∗s, and θ are determined by (28), (30), and (31).
Most of the literature that follows the seminal contributions of Shi (1997) and Lagos and




With bilateral matching, the market clearing condition (27) simpliﬁes to q∗s = q∗b ≡ q∗.
Using this equality, equations (30), and (31)b e c o m ee q u i v a l e n tt ot h ee q u a t i o n st h a t
deﬁne an equilibrium in Rocheteau and Wright (2003) without having assumed quasi-linear
preferences.
2.3 The Role of Insurance
In the equilibrium characterized above, all individuals have wealths in the linear interval of
the value function. Therefore, individuals, being locally risk neutral, are indiﬀerent as to
whether or not they purchase insurance as long as their future respective wealths remain
inside the interval [a,a] with probability one. The role of insurance is to allow individuals to
insure against risks that would drive their future wealths into the strictly concave regions of
the value function. This role is essential if individuals cannot avoid these type of risks while
following optimal strategies. Otherwise, the insurance of trading risks is not an essential
ﬁnancial instrument to complete the markets inside the villages. This subsection studies
17the conditions that make insurance essential or redundant.
Consider again the optimization problem of an individual whose value function V for
period t +1is increasing and concave with the linear segment (12). Deﬁne the mapping
T as in subsection 2.1 (except that now the individual has no access to insurance), so TV
is the value function for period t. The absence of insurance only matters for actions that
would lead the individual outside the interval [a,a]. Therefore, it only makes a diﬀerence in
the characterization of the bounds of the linear interval of TV.
In the absence of insurance, the optimal saving at t depends not only on the trading role
chosen but also on the outcome of the random search at night. Denoting with superscript 1
a successful search and with superscript 0 a failed search, the contingent net expenditures





























for j = b and s, and k =0and 1. Let
£
ab,ab¤
be the interval that
contains the values of a with optimal strategies that lead to ab0
+1,a b1
+1 ∈ [a,a]. Graphically,
£
ab,ab¤
is the linear interval of V b (a).S i n c ez∗b1 >z ∗b0, the bounds ab and ab are implicitly











.( 3 5 )
Similarly, since z∗s1 <z ∗s0, t h eb o u n d so ft h ei n t e r v a l[as,as] which contains the values of a
with optimal strategies that lead to as0
+1,a s1











.( 3 6 )
The values of the coeﬃcients v0,v ,a , and a that are candidates to generate a linear
interval in TV identical to that of V are implicitly deﬁned by (24), (25), and the following
18two equations:
a =




z∗s1 (1 + r)
r
. (38)
With these coeﬃcient values, the linear segments of V b and V s lie on a common aﬃne
function as it happened with insurance. However, now two possible cases may arise. In the
ﬁr s tc a s e ,t h ei n t e r v a l s
£
ab,ab¤
and [as,as] overlap in which case their union constitutes
[a,a] in TV. In this case, insurance is redundant because an individual with a ∈ [a,a] can
always pick an optimal strategy that leads to a+1 ∈ [a,a] without purchasing insurance.
In the second case, the intervals
£
ab,ab¤
and [as,as] do not overlap so their union does
not generate [a,a] in TV.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ec o n j e c t u r et h a tt h et r u ev a l u ef u n c t i o nh a sa
linear interval cannot be validated. As a result, insurance is essential in the sense that their
existence strictly improves the well being of individuals.
To characterize when the intervals
£
ab,ab¤
and [as,as] overlap, note that even without
i n s u r a n c e( 1 8 )h o l d s ,s oz∗s1 >z ∗b0 and z∗s0 <z ∗b1. These inequalities together with (36)
imply as <a b and as < ab. Therefore, the intervals
£
ab,ab¤
and [as,as] o v e r l a pi fa no n l yi f






Finally, using (18) and the deﬁnitions (33) and (34), (39) simpliﬁes into condition (40) in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Consider the equilibrium allocation that solves the system of equations
(25)t o( 28). The insurance of trading risks is redundant to implement this equilibrium










With bilateral matching, condition (40) can be further simpliﬁed because then q∗b = q∗s.
19Using this equality together with i ≡ (1 + r)γ − 1, we obtain the following corollary to
Proposition 2:
Corollary 1: With bilateral matching (32), the insurance of trading risks is redundant





The simplicity of Corollary 1 helps to provide intuition on Proposition 2. Consider an
equilibrium with a constant money supply (γ =1and τ =0 ). According to Corollary 1
this monetary policy makes insurance essential, so let us see why this is the case. In the
equilibrium with complete markets inside the village, individuals produce the quantity
of the general good that they consume day after day. In the absence of insurance, an
individual may fail to ﬁnd a trading opportunity at night for an indeﬁnite time. If this
happens, any positive holdings of bonds produces interest, so wealth accumulates above
any potential upper bound a. Similarly, if night trading opportunities are not realized, a
positive debt increases without bound, so wealth falls below any potential lower bound a.
Consequently, no credit can take place without incurring a positive probability of escaping
a potential interval [a,a].
Conversely, if condition (41) holds, even if a buyer fails to be able to purchase the speciﬁc
good, the opportunity cost of holding money is suﬃciently large to avoid wealth from
overtaking the value of a that satisﬁes (37). Similarly, the lump-sum transfers associated
with the growth of the money supply are suﬃcient to guarantee a minimum income to
sellers to avoid wealth falling below ain (38). Therefore, if (41) holds, there is a set of
optimal strategies for the individual that allows wealth to remain in the linear interval
forever, so insurance is redundant.
3 Financial Contracts versus Lotteries
The linearity of the value function found in the previous section is related to the derivation
20of quasi-linear preferences in the Rogerson (1988) model of indivisible labor. In both cases,
the linearity arises from a binary choice in the space of feasible policies. In the indivisible
labor literature, lotteries are commonly used to support equilibrium allocations.8 This
section shows that under certain conditions lotteries can play a similar role here. That
is, it shows that a fair lottery can substitute for credit and insurance to attain market
completeness inside the villages, even if these lotteries require no memory about personal
histories and no observability of trading opportunities.
Consider an environment identical to the one studied in the previous section except
that now individuals are anonymous both inside and outside their village. As a result,
individuals have no access to credit and insurance contracts. Instead, individuals can play a
fair lottery during the day. A lottery ticket delivers the same day δ goods with probability
ψ at the cost ψδ. As long as ψδ is paid, the individual is able to choose both δ and ψ
subject to the constraints δ ≥ 0 and ψ ∈ [0,1].
The optimal plans of a representative individual are characterized using similar recursive
m e t h o d st ot h o s eo ft h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n .L e tV (a+1) be the value function at the beginning
of period t +1and consider the optimal plans for period t. Conditional on being a buyer,
the utility of having wealth ˜ a after playing the lottery is given by a value function V b (˜ a)
that satisﬁes:
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8 See Rocheteau, Rupert, Shell, and Wright (2004) for a monetary search model that uses the indivisibility of labor to
motivate the quasi-linear preferences in a Lagos and Wright (2005) model.
21Analogously, conditional on being a seller, the value function V s(˜ a) satisﬁes:
V







































Since money is the only asset to carry wealth, the gross return of the unspent wealth
after the night market is equal to inverse of the inﬂation factor γ. Furthermore, since the
individual cannot hold negative amounts of wealth, the wealth at the beginning of next
period must obey:
a+1 ≥ 0.( 4 8 )
Depending on the trading role picked and the success or failure in ﬁnding a trading





Each day, after the lottery has been played, the individual chooses the trading role to be
played at night. This binary choice implies that the utility of an individual prior to any
consumption-production activity but afte rt h el o t t e r yh a sb e e np l a y e di sg i v e nb y :







The individual can randomize initial wealth using the lottery. Therefore, the value function




ψ˜ V [a + δ(1 − ψ)] + (1 − ψ) ˜ V (a − ψδ)
o
, (50)
subject to ψ ∈ [0,1]and δ ≥ 0.T h ew e a l t h˜ a after the lottery outcome is stochastic. If
the individual wins the lottery, ˜ a = a + δ(1 − ψ). Otherwise, ˜ a = a − ψδ. The true value
function V must obey the Bellman’s equation: V = TV.
The following proposition states the conditions for the lottery to complete the markets
inside the village. Also, it characterizes the value function in a stationary equilibrium in
22which this condition is satisﬁed.
Proposition 3: Let
¡
x∗b,y ∗b,q ∗b,x ∗s,y ∗s,q∗s,v,p,θ,τ
¢
be a monetary equilibrium




∗b − τ + pq
∗b, and ¯ z
s = x
∗s − y
∗s − τ. (51)









s ≤ 0, (52)
then the following statements hold in a monetary equilibrium with lotteries:




as an equilibrium, so the
markets inside the village are complete without credit and insurance.
2-The value function V (a) is continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and concave.
Moreover, V (a) is aﬃne in the interval
£
0, ¯ zb¤
with slope v and intercept (24).
The linear segment of V comes now from the randomization of wealth at the beginning of
a period. This randomization convexiﬁes the binary choice of trading role to be performed
at night. Intuitively, inside the linear segment, higher wealth allows the individual to
purchase lottery tickets with a higher probability of winning. Therefore, wealth changes
the probabilities of being a buyer or a seller, but conditional on a particular trading role
individuals consume and produce quantities that are independent from their initial wealth.
With expected utility preferences, utility is linear on these probabilities, so V is an aﬃne




The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix. The crucial step of this proof is
summarized here and illustrated in Figure 2. Consider an individual whose value function
V for period t +1is increasing and concave. Conditional on being a buyer or a seller, the
individual is maximizing a concave objective subject to a convex set of feasible policies.
Moreover, the set of feasible policies unambiguously expands with ˜ a. Therefore, the value
functions V b (˜ a) and V s (˜ a) are increasing and concave as it is depicted by the thin lines
23in Figure 2. In general, the value function ˜ V (˜ a), deﬁned as the maximum of V b (˜ a) and
V s (˜ a), is not concave (see Figure 2). However, the individual has an incentive to gamble
the initial wealth a to avoid the values of ˜ a that lie in the regions where ˜ V is not concave.
In Figure 2, an individual with a inside the interval
£
¯ zs, ¯ zb¤
has an incentive to gamble
a − ¯ zs of the initial wealth to buy a lottery ticket with payout ¯ zb − ¯ zs0. As a result of this
gamble, the individual attains ˜ a =¯ zb with probability (a − ¯ zs)/
¡
¯ zb − ¯ zs¢
,a n d˜ a =¯ zs with
complementary probability. The expected utility of the gamble is the straight line tangent
to V b and V s, which lies above ˜ V.The value function TV for period t (thick line in Figure
2) is the concave hull of ˜ V . Therefore, TV is increasing and concave. Furthermore, as
long as V b and V s cross (as it is implied by the premises of Proposition 3), it has a linear
segment.
In Proposition 3, we need to impose condition (52) to ensure that the interval of wealth
for which the value function is linear is absorbing. With bilateral matching, condition (52)
simpliﬁes neatly to a restriction on the rates of growth of the money supply. This restriction
is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: With bilateral matching (32), in a stationary monetary equilibrium a
fair lottery substitutes for credit and insurance of trading risks to complete the markets
inside the village if the net rate of growth of the money supply is not negative, so
γ ≥ 1. (53)
A si nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,t h eﬁrst order conditions (17) and equilibrium in the goods
market (26) imply x∗s = x∗b = y∗s = y∗b. In addition, bilateral matching implies q∗b = q∗s.
Consequently, the equalities in (51) simplify to ¯ zs = −τ,and ¯ zb = pq∗b −τ.These equalities
together with the government budget constraint (28), imply that (53) is equivalent to (52).
The intuition why condition (53) is needed for the lottery to achieve market completeness
inside the villages is the following. Individuals use the lottery to gamble in such a way that
if they win they ﬁnish the day with the money balances needed to pay the night purchases
24of a successful buyer, and if they loose they ﬁnish the day with zero money balances. With
deﬂation (γ<1) the monetary transfer is negative (it is a lump-sum tax). Therefore,
individuals that start the day with zero wealth (successful buyers and frustrated sellers)
cannot aﬀord any lottery gamble that delivers at least the wealth necessary to pay the
lump-sum tax that ﬁnances the deﬂation while maintaining x∗b = y∗b or x∗s = y∗s. These
individuals have to break one of these equalities to ﬁnance the lump-sum tax. In doing so,
they break the condition for the markets inside the village to be complete.9
4 Discussion
The analysis of the preceding sections shows that complete ﬁnancial markets in each village
support an equilibrium with simple distributions of money holdings. In this sense, complete
ﬁnancial markets substitutes for the representative household in the framework advanced
by Shi (1997) and for the quasi-linear preferences in the framework advanced by Lagos and
Wright (2005). Moreover, with the assumptions made so far, individuals have an absorbing
linear segment in their value functions. This linearity is convenient not only to characterize
an equilibrium, but also to provide mild conditions under which either a lottery or a
risk-free bond are suﬃcient to achieve market completeness inside a village. This section
discusses the generality of these results.
An endogenous buyer-seller choice at the beginning of each day is crucial for the
individuals to have a linear segment in their value function. However, the endogenous
buyer-seller choice is not needed to have market completeness inside the villages. For
example, if exogenously some individuals (buyers) are capable of consuming at night but
not producing, while other individuals (sellers) have the complementary abilities, then
the insurance of trading risks leads to the equality of the intertemporal marginal rates of
substitution for the general good. As a result, an equalitarian distribution of wealth is
9 This outcome is reminiscent to Bewley’s (1983) diﬃculty of deﬂationary policies although it does
not hinge on the existence or not of a well deﬁned equilibrium.
25perpetuated indeﬁnitely. Hence, the distribution of money holdings is easy to characterize.
To support an equilibrium in this variation of the model, insurance is always essential. That
is, neither credit nor lotteries can substitute for insurance to achieve market completeness
inside the villages.
The frameworks introduced by Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005) are applicable
to a wide variety of equilibrium concepts. For example, Rocheteau and Wright (2005)
show how the Lagos and Wright framework can be adapted to three alternative ways of
determining the terms of trade in the frictional markets that use money as the medium of
exchange: generalized Nash bargaining, Walrasian competition, and competitive search.
This paper assumes Walrasian competition because it is the simplest and most widely used
equilibrium concept in economics. However, the key results summarized in Propositions
1 to 3 are applicable to the other equilibrium concepts used by Rocheteau and Wright
(2005) with the following qualiﬁcations. First, the concavity of the value function is harder
to prove in non-Walrasian environments. In particular, with generalized Nash bargaining
the conditions on ﬁrst principles that ensure the concavity of value functions are quite
restrictive. This technical problem is well discussed in Lagos and Wright (2005) and their
discussion applies to the framework of this paper. Second, insurance contracts may be
more complicated in non-Walrasian environments. Again, generalized Nash bargaining
oﬀers special diﬃculties in this respect because the outcome of bargaining depends on
the reservation utilities of potential traders. To calculate these reservation utilities, we
have to allow for the possibility that bargaining in a trade meeting breaks down. Once
this possibility is introduced, if the value function is strictly concave, individuals have an
incentive to insure not only trading opportunities but also the outcome of bargaining. To
accomplish this, insurance contracts have to specify the details of bargaining strategies.
This raises the issue of how these contracts can be enforced if trades occur in decentralized
markets. This diﬃculty does not appear either with an endogenous buyer-seller choice
( i n d i v i d u a l sa r el o c a l l yr i s kn e u t r a ls ot h e yh a v en o ti n c e n t i v et oi n s u r et h eo u t c o m eo f
bargaining) or with competitive search.
26Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Let C (a) be the space of bounded and continuous functions f :[ amin,∞) → R with the
sup norm. Use the Bellman’s equation implied by (3) to (11) to deﬁne the mapping T of
C (a) onto itself by substituting f for V in the right hand sides of (4) and (7) and denoting
as Tf(a) t h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 2 ) .F o rag i v e na, the set of feasible policies is non-empty,
compact-valued, and continuous. The utility function U is bounded and continuous on the
set of feasible policies, and 0 <β<1. Therefore, Theorem 4.6 in Stokey and Lucas with
Prescott (1989) implies that there is a unique ﬁxed point to the mapping T, which is the
value function V.
Let V (a) be the subset of functions in C (a) that are increasing, concave, and with the
linear segment (12). Consider again the mapping T deﬁned in the previous paragraph. The
argument following Proposition 1 in the main text shows that if the coeﬃcients v0,v ,a ,
and a have the values speciﬁed in (22) to (24) with z∗j and S∗j for j = b and s consistent
with (17), T maps V (a) onto itself. Therefore, since T is a contraction mapping and V (a)
is closed, V satisﬁes the properties of Proposition 1 with the coeﬃcients speciﬁed by (22)
to (24). With the Inada conditions assumed on U, the choices of the individual are interior,
so V is continuously diﬀerentiable¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Using the mapping T deﬁned by (42) to (50), construct a sequence of value functions V0,
V1,... that satisfy: Vn = TV n−1 for n =1 ,2,... Since money is the only asset and money
holdings cannot be negative the domain of these functions is [0,∞).
Let V0 be the aﬃne value function V0(a)=v0 + va,w h e r ev0 and v are the values that
s o l v e( 2 4 )t o( 2 8 ) .C o n d i t i o n a lo nb e i n gab u y er or a seller, the value functions that map
wealth ˜ a after playing the lottery onto utilities are:
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˜ a + y
s + τ ≥ x
s. (57)
The timing of events allows the wealth ˜ a to be negative, in which case the individual
gambles part of the net earnings made during the day in the lottery. Therefore, the domain
of V b and V s is [−¯ y − τ,∞),w h e r e¯ y is the maximum possible production during the
day. In the domain of V b and V s, the programs (54) to (57) maximize a continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing, and concave objective on a non-empty and convex set of policies.
Therefore, the solutions to (54) to (57) are unique, and the value functions V b and V s
are well deﬁned, increasing, and concave. With the Inada conditions assumed on U,
the non-negativity constraints on xb,y b, and qbare not binding, so V b and V s are also
continuously diﬀerentiable.






























where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (55). If this multiplier is equal to
v − βvγ−1, the ﬁrst order conditions (58) are identical to (17). So for λ = v − βvγ−1,
t h es o l u t i o nt o( 5 8 )i s
¡
x∗b,y ∗b,q∗b¢
. With this solution, the constraint (55) holds with
equality if ˜ a =¯ zb (see [51]). Therefore, for ˜ a =¯ zb the unique solution to (54)-(55) is
¡
x∗b,y ∗b,q ∗b¢





= λ + βvγ−1 = v. Moreover, the concavity of V b implies V b
a (˜ a) ≤ v if ˜ a ≥ ¯ zb,
and V b
a (˜ a) ≥ v if ˜ a ≤ ¯ zb. An analogous treatment to the seller’s maximization program
28(56)-(55) yields the following results. At ˜ a =¯ zs, the optimal choice is (x∗s,y∗s,q∗s). If
˜ a ≥ ¯ zs,t h e nV s
a (˜ a) ≤ v. If ˜ a ≤ ¯ zs,t h e nV s















b − ¯ z
s¢
. (59)
Furthermore, at ¯ zs the individual replicates the same consumption and production as with
credit and insurance, and the relevant portion of next period’s value function and wealth
are the same. Therefore, V s (¯ zs)=v0 + v¯ zs.
Figure 2 uses the properties derived in the previous paragraph to display V b and V s.
In Figure 2, V b and V s are continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and concave functions.





a (¯ zs)=v. Furthermore, the linear
segment that connects V b ¡
¯ zb¢
and V s (¯ zs) must also have slope v. For a given wealth ˜ a after
the lottery is played, the individual picks the trading role that brings maximum utility. In
Figure 2, the individual chooses to be a buyer for ˜ a>ˆ a and to be a seller for ˜ a<ˆ a. The
individual is indiﬀerent between the two roles at ˜ a =ˆ a. Therefore, utility of the individual
after the lottery is given by the function: ˜ V (˜ a)=m a x
©
V b (˜ a),Vs (˜ a)
ª
.
Consider now the optimal lottery gamble of an individual with initial wealth a.A s
long as the probability ψ is between zero and one, the individual can use the lottery to
randomize between any two values of ˜ a :˜ a0 and ˜ a1. The respective probabilities of these
two outcomes are: (a − ˜ a0)/(˜ a1 − ˜ a0) and (˜ a1 − a)/(˜ a1 − ˜ a0). The condition ψ ∈ [0,1]
is equivalent to a ∈ [˜ a0,˜ a1]. Graphically, the utility achieved from this gamble is given
by the vertical distance from the horizontal axis to the straight segment connecting the
utilities achieved with the two possible outcomes of ˜ a. It is clear from observing Figure 2
that the optimal gamble for an individual with a ∈
£
¯ zs, ¯ zb¤
is two pick ˜ a0 =¯ zs and ˜ a1 =¯ zb.
Algebraically, the same result is attained from the ﬁrst order conditions of problem (50).
The utility of the individual prior playing the lottery is given by V1 (a)=TV 0 (a),
which graph is the convex-hull of the graph of ˜ V (a). The value function V1 is continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing, and concave. Furthermore, in the interval comprised between ¯ zs
29and ¯ zb the function V1 is aﬃne with the same coeﬃcients v0 and v as V0. The behavior of
an individual whose value function for next period is V1 is identical to the behavior just
described for an individual whose value function is V0 as long as the next period wealth
under the actions described is in the aﬃne interval with slope v. Condition (52) ensures
that this is the case. That is, if the individual is a failed buyer or a successful seller ends up
with real wealth pγ−1q∗b, and pγ−1q∗s respectively. These values cannot be greater than ¯ zb.
If the individual is a successful buyer or a failed seller ends up with zero real wealth, so ¯ zs
cannot be greater than zero. For initial wealths outside the interval comprised between ¯ zs
and ¯ zb, the concavity of V1 implies that V1 (a) ≤ V0 (a).
The same arguments apply to all members of the sequence of value functions V0,V 1,...




. The monotonicity of T implies Vn (a) ≤ Vn−1 (a) for all n =1 ,2,...
Moreover, all these functions are bounded below by zero. Therefore, they must converge
point-wise to a function V, which is a ﬁxed point of T. (If U i sb o u n d e do nt h es e to f
feasible policies, T is a contraction and so the convergence must be uniform to the unique




as all members of the sequence. Since V is concave and U is diﬀerentiable,
the function V must be continuously diﬀerentiable because the Inada conditions on U
imply that the consumption and production choices are interior (non-negative). The ﬁrst
statement in Proposition 3 has been proved above given that the optimal policies with
terminal value functions V0 and V coincide¥
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